Gray Market and Parallel Import Toolkit: Controlling Genuine Goods

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This toolkit is the curated tour of everything in the Marksy corpus that bears on genuine goods sold outside an authorized channel, from the first suspicious marketplace listing to a Lever-rule grant published in the Customs Bulletin. It starts with the classification decision that governs everything else — counterfeit, parallel import, domestic diversion, or refurbished good — because the four categories carry different burdens and radically different downside for guessing wrong in writing. It then maps the first sale doctrine and its exceptions, the material-difference record built as a trial exhibit, the self-audit of the brand owner's own U.S. sales that decides whether a case exists at all, the Warner-Lambert quality-control theory and the licensing records that double as naked-licensing insurance, and the three border tools that behave nothing alike: Section 526 of the Tariff Act, Section 42 of the Lanham Act through the Lever rule, and a Section 337 investigation at the International Trade Commission. Two further sections cover the preventive half of the practice — engineering a defensible U.S. configuration, unit-level serialization, and distribution clauses with audit and diversion teeth — and the antitrust boundary those clauses run into, where resale price maintenance, Robinson-Patman secondary-line exposure, and Magnuson-Moss warranty rules turn a brand-protection program into a counterclaim. It closes with a branching reading path for six common situations, a primary-authorities table, the Marksy templates that apply, and annotated pointers to the adjacent toolkits.

IP and Technology > Trademarks | Toolkit | Published 16 April 2025 - Updated 5 May 2026 | Casey Scott McKay - marksy.us

Summary. This is the curated tour of everything in the Marksy corpus that bears on genuine goods sold outside an authorized channel — from the first suspicious marketplace listing to a Lever-rule grant published in the Customs Bulletin. It begins with the classification decision that governs everything else, because counterfeit goods, parallel imports, domestic diversion, and refurbished goods carry different burdens and radically different downside for guessing wrong in writing. It then maps the first sale doctrine and its exceptions, the material-difference record built as a trial exhibit, the self-audit that decides whether a case exists at all, the quality-control theory and the licensing records that double as naked-licensing insurance, and the three border tools that behave nothing alike. Two sections cover the preventive half of the practice — product engineering, serialization, and distribution clauses with audit teeth — and the antitrust boundary those clauses run into. A branching reading path, an authorities table, the applicable templates, and annotated pointers to adjacent toolkits close it out.

Keywords: gray market goods · parallel imports · first sale doctrine · trademark exhaustion · material differences · lever rule · cbp recordation · 19 c.f.r. 133.23 · section 526 tariff act · quality control exception · warner-lambert elements · all or substantially all · distribution agreement diversion · serialization and product codes · authorized dealer program · robinson-patman act · resale price maintenance · section 337 exclusion order · reseller defense · post-sale confusion


Start Here

This is the corner of trademark law where the goods are real, the mark is real, the manufacturer is your client, and you may still have a federal case — or nothing at all, depending on facts your client can develop in two weeks for less than the cost of one deposition.

A gray market matter is not won by finding a fake. It is won, or lost, by proving that the article on the marketplace is not the thing your mark promises to American buyers, and by proving it without discovering mid-case that your client has been quietly selling the foreign version at an airport duty-free counter for two years.

Who this is for. In-house counsel and brand-protection managers who just found their product listed 30% under MSRP by a seller they have never heard of. Outside counsel handed a photograph of a foreign power adapter and asked for a strategy memo by Friday. Channel lawyers writing the agreement that decides whether next year's incident is a breach claim or a shrug. And resellers who have received a letter and need to know how much of it is real.

Three questions this toolkit answers.

  1. Is this actually a gray market problem — rather than counterfeiting, ordinary domestic diversion, or a refurbishment dispute — and what does that classification foreclose?
  2. Do I have a material difference I can prove, and does my client's own conduct destroy it before I file?
  3. What do I file, where, in what order, and what does each step cost — court, Customs, the Commission, the platform, or the contract?

If you read only one thing, read Gray Market Goods: The First Sale Doctrine, Material Differences, and Parallel Imports. It traces the doctrine from an 1886 mineral-water case through A. Bourjois & Co. v. Katzel, 260 U.S. 689 (1923), to the modern materiality test, and it opens with the most useful fact in the field: half a calorie of difference in a breath mint decided a federal appeal. Ferrero U.S.A., Inc. v. Ozak Trading, Inc., 952 F.2d 44, 46 (3d Cir. 1991). It is the doctrinal spine every other document here hangs from, and it should be read before anything goes out on letterhead.

One exception. If you have not yet decided whether the goods are counterfeit, spend forty minutes first on Trademark Counterfeiting: Civil Seizures, Statutory Damages, and Criminal Exposure. Misclassification is the most expensive unforced error here, and it is almost always made in a demand letter drafted before anyone examined the goods.


The Whole Field, in One Pass

Trademark law's default is that you cannot control resale. Once the owner or someone it authorized makes a first sale of a particular article, its rights in that article are exhausted, and the buyer may resell it, advertise it, and compete with the owner using the owner's own mark. Restatement (Third) of Unfair Competition § 24 & cmt. b (1995); Sebastian Int'l, Inc. v. Longs Drug Stores Corp., 53 F.3d 1073, 1074-76 (9th Cir. 1995). That rule is older than the Lanham Act, and it is why brand owners are angrier about gray goods than the law lets them be.

What the doctrine gives back is narrower and more interesting. A product is "genuine" for infringement purposes only if it is the thing the American consumer expects when she sees the mark in this market — genuineness is a property of the transaction, not the object. Change enough about the article, and a physically authentic product becomes a false designation of origin under 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a). The test comes from Societe Des Produits Nestle, S.A. v. Casa Helvetia, Inc., 982 F.2d 633, 641, 644 (1st Cir. 1992): a difference is material if consumers would likely consider it relevant to a purchasing decision; the threshold is deliberately low; equal quality is irrelevant; and once materiality is shown a rebuttable presumption of confusion follows.

Five exceptions to first sale get litigated, in roughly this order of frequency: no authorized first sale at all; material differences; evasion of a real quality-control system; misrepresentation of authorization; and inadequate disclosure of repackaging or repair. Underneath all five sits the ordinary question of likely confusion.

Three limits keep the doctrine honest, and each kills cases. Price is never a material difference — if it were, the exception would swallow the rule, since price arbitrage is the whole reason gray goods exist. Pretextual quality control is not a quality-control system; glancing at cartons and spot-checking samples does not make evasion actionable. Iberia Foods Corp. v. Romeo, 150 F.3d 298, 304-06 (3d Cir. 1998). And in the Federal and Ninth Circuits, the owner must show that all or substantially all of its authorized U.S. goods carry the asserted difference. Bourdeau Bros., Inc. v. Int'l Trade Comm'n, 444 F.3d 1317, 1324 (Fed. Cir. 2006); Hokto Kinoko Co. v. Concord Farms, Inc., 738 F.3d 1085, 1095 (9th Cir. 2013). A brand that sells both versions here has already told American consumers the mark means both things.

The border runs on different rules, and its three tools behave nothing alike. Section 526 of the Tariff Act, 19 U.S.C. § 1526, is a strict entry bar requiring neither confusion nor difference — but it reaches only marks owned by U.S. persons, and the common-ownership and common-control carve-outs upheld in K Mart Corp. v. Cartier, Inc., 486 U.S. 281 (1988), and codified at 19 C.F.R. § 133.23(a), take it away from nearly every multinational that sources from its own subsidiaries. Section 42 of the Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1124, does beat common control — but only through the Lever rule, only for physical differences, only on application under 19 C.F.R. § 133.2(e), and only as what is honestly a labeling remedy, because an importer that affixes the prescribed legend enters lawfully. 19 C.F.R. § 133.23(b). A Section 337 investigation, 19 U.S.C. § 1337, buys a genuine prospective exclusion order for seven figures.

Two facts frame everything else. Trademark now stands alone on territorial exhaustion: copyright went international in Kirtsaeng v. John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 568 U.S. 519 (2013), and patent followed in Impression Products, Inc. v. Lexmark International, Inc., 581 U.S. 360 (2017), so the old trick of registering a logo engraving and suing importers under 17 U.S.C. § 602(a) is dead. And the material-differences doctrine is functionally a territorial exhaustion rule wearing a confusion costume — the only one left standing.

The practical consequence organizes the rest of this toolkit. Because you cannot control resale but you can control what the mark stands for here, the highest-return work is not litigation. It is engineering a real, provable, preferably photographable difference into the U.S. configuration; actually operating the quality-control system you will one day describe in a declaration; serializing at the unit level so that code removal becomes the actionable act under Zino Davidoff SA v. CVS Corp., 571 F.3d 238, 244-46 (2d Cir. 2009); and putting territory, audit, and diversion-charge clauses into distribution agreements so the leak becomes a named counterparty's breach rather than a diffuse grievance. Litigation is what you do after that program tells you whom to sue. And there is a fence around all of it: a program built to punish discounters rather than protect a quality system is a price-fixing scheme in a trademark costume.


Theme 1 — Classify the Goods Before You Write Anything

Four situations look identical in a photograph and diverge completely in law. Counterfeits unlock ex parte seizure under 15 U.S.C. § 1116(d), trebled profits under § 1117(b), statutory damages up to $2,000,000 per mark per type of goods under § 1117(c), and criminal exposure under 18 U.S.C. § 2320. Parallel imports unlock ordinary Lanham Act remedies and a narrow customs route. Domestic diversion — a salon shampoo in a drugstore — usually unlocks nothing at all. Matrix Essentials, Inc. v. Emporium Drug Mart, Inc., 988 F.2d 587, 593 (5th Cir. 1993). Repaired and refurbished goods run on disclosure adequacy under Champion Spark Plug Co. v. Sanders, 331 U.S. 125, 129-32 (1947).

The cost of getting this wrong lands entirely on the brand owner. Writing "counterfeit" about genuine goods invites a declaratory judgment action in a forum you did not pick, supplies a false-statement theory if you repeated it to a marketplace, and follows you into the exceptional-case analysis under 15 U.S.C. § 1117(a) for the life of the matter.

Trap. "Gray market" appears nowhere in the Lanham Act. It is a commercial description, not a legal category. The court will ask the same question it asks in every infringement case; the framing only helps you organize evidence.


Theme 2 — Building the Material-Difference Record, and Auditing Yourself First

Materiality is proved with a table, not an adjective. The working form is a comparison matrix in which every row carries an attribute, the U.S. specification, the gray specification, the source of proof, and the name of the person who will sign the declaration. Composition, regulatory compliance, electrical fit, packaging, language, warranty, service network, authentication codes, quality-control procedures, accompanying materials, product line — eleven categories, worked in that order, because the early ones carry themselves and the late ones get fought.

Before any of that, one unglamorous step decides whether a case exists. Does the brand owner already sell the foreign version into the United States? Duty-free and travel retail, military exchanges, employee stores, cross-border e-commerce fulfilled from a foreign warehouse, an acquired brand nobody harmonized — each is a live grenade under Bourdeau Bros. and Hokto, and outside those circuits it is still the best cross-examination the defendant will get. Two to four weeks of operations time, one signed memo. Run it before the demand letter, not after the document request.

Two disciplines make the matrix work. Tie every row to a consumer reason: not "the manual is in Japanese" but "a purchaser who cannot read the calibration procedure cannot verify the accuracy that is the entire function of the instrument." And decide early whether you need a survey. Where the difference is regulatory and visible, courts have found materiality on the face of the record. Where it is invisible — a removed production code, a warranty term, a service entitlement — a well-designed relevance survey converts argument into evidence, and a badly designed one is excluded under Fed. R. Evid. 702 and takes your credibility with it.

Practice tip. Write the comparison matrix as though it were already Exhibit A to a declaration, because it will be. Number the rows, tab the photographs to the same exhibit, and keep one purchased unit sealed as a control. Judges read the table and skim the brief.


Theme 3 — Quality Control: One File, Two Jobs

The quality-control exception is the strongest theory in gray market practice and the one brand owners most often plead into a wall. The Second Circuit's elements require proof of legitimate, substantial, non-pretextual procedures; that the owner abides by them with its own goods; and that sale of the defendant's goods will diminish the mark's value. Warner-Lambert Co. v. Northside Dev. Corp., 86 F.3d 3, 6 (2d Cir. 1996). Element two is where the theory dies, because a written SOP nobody follows is worse than no SOP — it hands the defendant a document to cross-examine your witness with. See Polymer Tech. Corp. v. Mimran, 37 F.3d 74, 78-81 (2d Cir. 1994). Element three is friendlier than it reads: Zino Davidoff holds that destroying traceability and recall capability harms the mark regardless of whether the individual units are worse. 571 F.3d at 244-46.

Here is what justifies the budget. The records that defeat a first sale defense are the same records that prove your license is not naked. Build them once, use them twice.


Theme 4 — The Border: Recordation, the Lever Rule, and What CBP Will Not Do

Recordation is the price of admission and stops no gray market shipment by itself. Only Principal Register marks may be recorded, 19 C.F.R. § 133.1(a); the fee is $190 per class, 19 C.F.R. § 133.3(b); and Customs enforces to the four corners of your identification of goods, so a registration for "cosmetics" is inert when the container holds dietary supplements. What recordation buys is officer visibility, and entitlement to the seizure disclosures under 19 C.F.R. § 133.21(e) — manufacturer, exporter, importer, delivered within thirty days, the cheapest intelligence in the practice.

The Lever rule, honestly described. Under 19 C.F.R. § 133.2(e) you may apply for protection against physically and materially different foreign goods bearing your U.S.-owned mark, and it works even where the producers are affiliated — exactly where Section 526 abandons you. Expect four to fourteen months and $15,000 to $40,000; expect the grant to be product-specific, so next year's model needs its own application; and expect the summary of differences you file to be published in the Customs Bulletin, where your diverters will read it. Then expect that an importer affixing the prescribed legend enters lawfully — "This product is not a product authorized by the United States trademark owner for importation and is physically and materially different from the authorized product," conspicuous, near the mark, designed to remain until first retail sale. 19 C.F.R. § 133.23(b). Most diverters will not label, because the legend destroys the product at retail. Sophisticated ones will. Keep the court case alive.

| Tool | Material difference required? | Beats affiliates? | Decided by | What you actually get | |---|---|---|---|---| | Lanham Act §§ 32, 43(a) | Yes (or QC evasion / misrepresentation) | Yes | Federal court | Injunction, profits, damages, fees in exceptional cases | | Tariff Act § 526 | No | No19 C.F.R. § 133.23(a) | CBP; private action under § 1526(c) | Exclusion, seizure, forfeiture | | Lanham Act § 42 / Lever rule | Yes — physical only | Yes | CBP, on § 133.2(e) application | Exclusion unless the importer labels | | ITC § 337 | Yes | Yes | ITC, before an ALJ | Prospective exclusion order; no damages |


Theme 5 — Distribution Control and Serialization

Your leverage over the distributor who leaked is the distribution agreement. Your leverage over whoever bought from that distributor is the material-differences doctrine. Brand owners fund the second and neglect the first, which is backwards: once an authorized first sale happens, the legality of every later sale is irrelevant to trademark law, even a sale in flagrant breach of a franchise agreement. McDonald's Corp. v. Shop at Home, Inc., 82 F. Supp. 2d 801, 812-13 (M.D. Tenn. 2000).

Stage 11 of the parallel-imports guide holds the clause library: territory and channel with an express disclaimer of price restriction; downstream flow-down and no-transshipment; code integrity; records and audit with a one-percent cost-shifting trigger; a liquidated diversion charge tied to the U.S. list-price differential; and forecast discipline with an over-order refusal right. That last pair stops the classic pattern — a 5,000-unit purchase order against an 1,800-unit forecast — before it becomes a lawsuit. Serialization is the other half: a code system that will carry a Zino Davidoff theory must be unique per unit, tied to shipment and customer and date, human- and machine-readable, capable of driving a recall, documented in an SOP that states its purpose, and hard to remove without visible damage. One to fifteen cents per unit.


Theme 6 — Where Brand Protection Becomes an Antitrust Problem

Everything in the previous section can be drafted lawfully, and every piece of it can be drafted into a counterclaim. The exposure is created in the drafting, not the enforcement.

Vertical non-price restraints — territory, channel, customer, anti-transshipment — are judged under the rule of reason. Continental T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania Inc., 433 U.S. 36, 57-59 (1977). Well-drafted anti-diversion clauses survive comfortably, because their justifications are the ones the rule of reason credits: preventing free riding on dealers' service investment, protecting a quality-control system, supporting warranty and recall infrastructure. Write those justifications into a recital — one paragraph, and the first thing the defense will reach for.

Resale price maintenance is where programs go wrong. Minimum RPM is rule-of-reason federally after Leegin Creative Leather Products, Inc. v. PSKS, Inc., 551 U.S. 877, 899 (2007), but a handful of states still treat it as per se unlawful, so a national program cannot rely on Leegin alone. Keep price out of the anti-diversion clauses and say so expressly. If the client wants price discipline, use a unilateral policy under United States v. Colgate & Co., 250 U.S. 300, 307 (1919) — announce the terms, do not negotiate them, do not accept assurances, terminate without discussion — because agreement can be inferred from conduct. Monsanto Co. v. Spray-Rite Serv. Corp., 465 U.S. 752, 764 (1984). A Colgate policy dies in the follow-up email.

Robinson-Patman matters in a way often missed. International two-tier pricing sits outside 15 U.S.C. § 13(a), which reaches sales for use, consumption, or resale within the United States — which is why the arbitrage that creates the gray market is lawful at all. But domestic two-tier pricing designed to punish diverters is squarely inside it, with a secondary-line theory where favored and disfavored purchasers actually compete. Volvo Trucks N. Am., Inc. v. Reeder-Simco GMC, Inc., 546 U.S. 164, 176-78 (2006). Functional discounts must reflect the cost of functions the buyer actually performs. Texaco Inc. v. Hasbrouck, 496 U.S. 543, 561-62 (1990).

Warranty conditions are the most useful material difference available and the most regulated. Conditioning coverage on purchase from an authorized dealer is generally permissible if stated in the written warranty, disclosed before sale, and applied consistently — but the Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act forbids tie-ins to branded articles or services absent no charge or an FTC waiver, 15 U.S.C. § 2302(c), and a warranty voided solely because the seller was unauthorized may not be a material difference where state law forbids that discrimination anyway. Bel Canto Design, Ltd. v. MSS Hifi, Inc., 837 F. Supp. 2d 208, 228 (S.D.N.Y. 2011).

Practice tip. Have antitrust counsel read the distribution agreement, the dealer policy, and the enforcement plan in one sitting. The clauses are usually fine in isolation and dangerous in combination — full-line forcing plus a loyalty discount plus a MAP program plus two-tier pricing reads very differently than any one of its parts. Stage 12 of the parallel-imports guide works the whole boundary with model language.


Theme 7 — Litigation, Remedies, and the Online Channel

Most of these cases are decided at the preliminary injunction, because gray inventory is finite and moves fast.

Most gray goods now surface on a marketplace rather than in a store. Buying a Competitor's Name matters because the easiest win in the field is not about the goods at all: a reseller advertising itself as authorized, or bidding on the brand with copy implying endorsement, is independently liable under 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a)(1) whatever the merchandise. Australian Gold, Inc. v. Hatfield, 436 F.3d 1228, 1241 (10th Cir. 2006). Running a Keyword and Paid-Search Trademark Program and the Keyword Advertising Compliance and Enforcement Checklist cover monitoring, complaint routes, and escalation. Run that audit before you sue: a screenshot of "Authorized Dealer" beats a chemistry report.


A Suggested Reading Path

The default sequence, for a brand owner starting from a listing.

  1. Gray Market Goods — the doctrine, end to end.
  2. Trademark Counterfeiting — enough to be certain which side of the line you are on.
  3. Gray Market Enforcement Checklist, Phases 1 through 4 — classify, buy, compare, self-audit. Stop here if Phase 4 comes back badly.
  4. Fighting or Defending Parallel Imports, Stages 5 through 10 — quality control, tracing, weapon selection, defendant selection, the border, the demand.
  5. Stopping Counterfeits at the Border — recordation and the Lever application in full.
  6. Drafting a Trademark License That Survives, plus Stage 11 of the guide — rebuild the system so the next incident is a breach claim.

If your situation is different, branch here.

| Situation | Read, in this order | |---|---| | You received a demand and you are the reseller | Stage 13 of the parallel-imports guideResponding to a Cease-and-Desist LetterRaising a Trademark Fair Use DefenseTrademark Fair Use Audit Checklist | | Your foreign producer is your own subsidiary | The K Mart discussion in the article → Stage 9.3 of the guide (Lever application) → Trademarks in the Deal | | The differences are warranty and service only | Consumer Surveys in Trademark CasesCommissioning and Attacking a Trademark Survey → Theme 6 above on Magnuson-Moss and state warranty law | | You are drafting before there is a problem | How to Draft a Trademark License AgreementDrafting a Trademark License That Survives → Stages 11 and 12 of the parallel-imports guide | | The problem is entirely on marketplaces | Online Brand Protection ToolkitAnticounterfeiting Program Checklist, Phases 3 and 6 → Keyword Advertising Compliance and Enforcement Checklist | | A declaratory judgment action landed first | Federal Court vs. TTAB → Stage 14 of the parallel-imports guideTrademark Litigation Toolkit |


Primary Authorities

| Authority | Holding or provision, in one line | |---|---| | 15 U.S.C. §§ 1114, 1125(a) | Infringement and false designation — the vehicle for every private gray market claim | | 15 U.S.C. § 1124 (§ 42) | Bars entry of merchandise copying or simulating a registered mark; basis of the Lever rule | | 19 U.S.C. § 1526 | Bars import of foreign goods bearing a U.S.-owned registered mark absent consent; § 1526(c) is a private action | | 19 U.S.C. § 1337 | ITC exclusion and cease-and-desist orders; prospective, in rem, expensive | | 19 C.F.R. §§ 133.1-133.7 | Recordation: Principal Register only, $190 per class, renewal within three months of expiration | | 19 C.F.R. § 133.2(d)-(e) | Common ownership (over 50%) and common control defined; Lever-rule application requirements | | 19 C.F.R. § 133.23 | Restricted gray market articles, the common-control carve-outs, the disclosure legend | | 15 U.S.C. § 1116(a); § 1117(a)-(c); § 1111 | TMA presumption of irreparable harm; profits, damages, and fees; the notice precondition to recovery | | 15 U.S.C. §§ 13(a), 2302(c) | Robinson-Patman price discrimination; Magnuson-Moss ban on warranty tie-ins | | Fed. R. Civ. P. 65(c), (d)(2); Fed. R. Evid. 702, 901 | Bond and who an injunction binds; expert admissibility and authentication of test-purchase evidence | | A. Bourjois & Co. v. Katzel, 260 U.S. 689 (1923) | A U.S. buyer of a foreign mark and its American goodwill may block parallel imports of the maker's genuine goods | | Prestonettes, Inc. v. Coty, 264 U.S. 359, 368 (1924) | Truthful use of a mark to describe repackaged genuine goods is lawful; the mark "is not taboo" | | Champion Spark Plug Co. v. Sanders, 331 U.S. 125, 129-32 (1947) | Refurbished goods may keep the mark with disclosure unless repair is so extensive the name is a misnomer | | K Mart Corp. v. Cartier, Inc., 486 U.S. 281 (1988) | Customs may exempt commonly owned or controlled affiliates from § 526, but not goods made under license abroad | | Societe Des Produits Nestle, S.A. v. Casa Helvetia, Inc., 982 F.2d 633 (1st Cir. 1992) | Material differences defeat first sale and presume confusion; equal quality is irrelevant | | Lever Bros. Co. v. United States, 981 F.2d 1330, 1338 (D.C. Cir. 1993) | Section 42 bars entry of physically different foreign goods even between affiliates | | Sebastian Int'l, Inc. v. Longs Drug Stores Corp., 53 F.3d 1073 (9th Cir. 1995) | Resale of genuine goods is not infringement; stocking a product is not a claim of authorization | | Warner-Lambert Co. v. Northside Dev. Corp., 86 F.3d 3, 6 (2d Cir. 1996) | Quality-control exception: substantial procedures, actual adherence, diminution of the mark's value | | Iberia Foods Corp. v. Romeo, 150 F.3d 298, 304-06 (3d Cir. 1998) | Pretextual inspection is not a system whose evasion makes goods non-genuine | | Bourdeau Bros., Inc. v. Int'l Trade Comm'n, 444 F.3d 1317, 1324 (Fed. Cir. 2006) | All or substantially all of the owner's U.S. goods must carry the asserted difference | | Zino Davidoff SA v. CVS Corp., 571 F.3d 238, 244-46 (2d Cir. 2009) | Removing production codes is actionable whether or not the goods are inferior | | Beltronics USA, Inc. v. Midwest Inventory Distrib., LLC, 562 F.3d 1067, 1073 (10th Cir. 2009) | A warranty voided by unauthorized purchase can be material absent adequate disclosure | | Kirtsaeng v. John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 568 U.S. 519 (2013) | Copyright's first sale reaches copies lawfully made abroad — the end of the copyright import weapon | | Impression Prods., Inc. v. Lexmark Int'l, Inc., 581 U.S. 360 (2017) | An authorized sale anywhere exhausts patent rights; post-sale restrictions are contract only | | Romag Fasteners, Inc. v. Fossil, Inc., 590 U.S. 212, 218 (2020) | Willfulness is not a precondition to disgorging profits under § 1117(a) | | Leegin Creative Leather Prods., Inc. v. PSKS, Inc., 551 U.S. 877, 899 (2007) | Minimum RPM is rule-of-reason federally — but not in every state |


Forms and Templates


Related Toolkits and Checklists


Related Documents

Articles

Guides

Checklists

Toolkits

Templates & Forms

Across the Wider Corpus

The Marksy library now extends well beyond the register. These sit outside this document's immediate subject and bear on it directly — sector-specific brand practice, the adjacent federal regimes, and the disputes a trademark question runs into once it leaves the USPTO.


This document is general information about the law, not legal advice, and does not create an attorney-client relationship. Trademark and copyright outcomes turn on specific facts. Marksy is not a law firm.

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